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Abstract
The digital identity problem is a complex one in large part because it involves per-
sonal data, the algorithms which compute reputations on the data and the management
of the identifiers that are linked to personal data. The reality of today is that personal
data of an individual is distributed throughout the Internet, in both private and public
institutions, and increasingly also on the user’s devices. In order to empower individuals
to have a say in who has access to their personal data and to enable individuals to make
use of their data for their own purposes, a coherent and scalable access authorization
architecture is required. Such an architecture must allow different data holders, data
providers and user-content generators to respond to an individual’s wishes with regards
to consent in a federated fashion. This federation must allow an individual to easily
manage access policies and provide consent as required by current and forthcoming data
privacy regulations. This paper describes the User Managed Access (UMA) architecture
and protocols that provide the foundation for scalable access authorization.
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1 Introduction
The advent of blockchain technology has again brought to the forefront the question of digital
identity. In order to transact securely on a blockchain system and have a meaningful engage-
ment on the Internet generally, insights are needed for individuals and parties involved as the
basis of trust establishment and risk management. These insights are typically conveyed as
digitally-signed assertions or claims. However, in order for algorithms to compute and derive
meaningful insights, data is needed for these algorithms. As such, one key dimension of the
digital identity problem is the challenge of providing privacy-preserving scalable access to
data distributed (siloed) throughout the Internet.
Another dimension of the digital identity problem is the privacy of personal data. Over the
last decade there has been a continuing decline in trust on the part of individuals with regards
to the handling and fair use of personal data [1]. Pew Research reported that 91 percent
of Americans agree or strongly agree that consumers have lost control over how personal
data is collected and used, while 80 percent who use social networking sites are concerned
about third parties accessing their shared data [2]. The Webbmedia Group, writing in the
Harvard Business Review, has identified data privacy as one of the top ten technology trends
of 2015 [3, 4]. This situation has also been compounded by the various recent reports of
attacks and theft of data (e.g. Anthem [5], Equifax [6]). Related to the loss of trust –
and perhaps as a consequence of it – is the recent emergence of new regulations aimed at
addressing data privacy. The enactment of the EU GDPR [7] has had influenced the data
privacy discourse in the United States and elsewhere [8]. At the state level, California has
issued the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [9].
The state of declining trust was already reported by the World Economic Forum in
2014 [10]. The WEF report was the culmination of a multi-year initiative with global in-
sights from various high level leaders from different sectors of society (industry, governments,
civil society and academia). A theme running through the 2014 WEF report is the need to
strengthen individual trust. The WEF report suggests three means to address this problem
(p.4 of [10]). Firstly, increase in transparency by focusing on engagement and response, and
by providing individuals with insight and meaningful control. This is instead of the current
approaches focusing on disclosure and providing details (which often overwhelm individu-
als). Secondly, improve accountability by orienting throughout the value chain (front-end
to back-end) with risks being equitably distributed. This is in contrast to the current in-
dustry practices that are oriented towards the front-end of the value chain with risks and
responsibilities residing with the individual. Thirdly, empowerment of individuals by way
giving them a say in how data about them is used by organizations and by giving individuals
the capacity to use data for their own purposes. Empowerment should be distributed with
shared incentives for empowering individuals and distributing value closer to the source of
data production (the individual). This is in contrast to the current approaches which are
focused on maintaining information differentials among a concentrated set of actors.
The recent 2018 Report on Global Consumer Trust from the Mobile Ecosystem Forum
(MEF) [11] points to a number interesting developments with regards to consumer trust in
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Figure 1: The Vision of Privacy 2.0 (after [12])
the context mobile devices and apps. A majority of respondents on this report have taken
one or more actions within the last two years to protect their privacy and mitigate potential
harm. The report states that 57 percent of users indicate that personal data collection is a
risk to them, and that 68 percent think it is important to know how their personal data is
being used. The report finds that the personal data market has matured, where smartphone
users are ready to do more, including managing their own data. However, tools need to
be easier to use and well understood. For the mobile space, the report finds that trust is
still a key ingredient for the acceptance of mobile services. A trusted service is more likely
to avoid punitive actions from the user, such as not downloading an app due to excessive
permissions. As such, there is a correlation between an individual’s trust in an organization,
their confidence to control their personal data, and their use of mobile devices and services.
Empowering people with the ability to control their identity and personal information is key
to earning trust and customer loyalty.
Echoing the WEF Report [10] and the MEF findings [11], we believe that individuals
need meaningful control over their personal data, which is increasingly distributed across
various entities on the Internet. The ordinary user finds the amount of data and complexity
of managing data to be overwhelming. Individuals want transparency in order to understand
what data about them is being collected and what it is being use for. However, individuals
also seek the following (see Figure 1): (i) choice in sharing with other parties, (ii) convenience
in sharing/approval with no outside influence, (iii) centralizable monitoring and management
for the individual, and (iv) control of who/what/how at a fine grain [12].
Today the reality is that personal data – which are co-created with the individual – typ-
ically does not reside with the individual, for practical reasons. The GDPR recognized this
reality, and reflected it by using the notion of data controllers and data processors1. There-
1 A data controller is the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or
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fore, in order to provide an individual with true meaningful control over their personal data
the controllers (of an individual’s personal data) must collectively provide an easy way for
the individual to configure access policies (consent rules) that will apply to the personal
data located at each of the controllers. We refer to this as authorization federation. The
overall goal of authorization federation is to empower the individual to set access policies
(consent permission) at one location (e.g. at one data controller) and have the access policies
propagated automatically to other data controllers and be enforced there also. In this way,
the individual is relieved from having to log-in to many sites for the purpose or configur-
ing the access policies multiple times. This is consistent with and follows from the WEF
recommendation of giving individuals the capacity to use data for their own purposes.
In the case where a third-party seeks information about an individual, then such access
must be privacy-preserving. Instead of allowing external third parties to simply read (copy)
personal data, privacy-preserving algorithmic approaches – such as the MIT Open Algorithms
approach [13, 14] – should be deployed. This approach advocates that (a) data never leaves
its repository, and that (b) instead the algorithms are transmitted to the data location and
be executed there, and that (c) only vetted algorithms are permitted to be executed. Thus,
data controllers and processors are able to increase individual privacy and comply to pri-
vacy regulations by obtaining consent for the execution of algorithms over the personal data
(without moving the data from the controller’s respository). The computed insights can then
be packaged as digitally-signed assertions or claims [15, 16, 17].
This paper focuses on the notion of a federated authorization model as applied to personal
data held by various data controllers. We discuss a specific solution called User Managed
Access (UMA) which provides the foundation for the federation among the controllers.
In the next section we briefly review policy-based authorization, which has been a topic
of interest within the computer industry for over four decades now. Section 3 discusses
the notion of mediated authentication, which is today commonly manifested in the form of
identity provider services in the consumer space. We expand the notion of mediation to that
authorization in Section 4, and describe the UMA authorization architecture in Section 5.
The paper closes in Section 6 with some conclusions.
2 Policy-Based Access Control and Authorization
The issue of controlling access to multi-user resources has been an important theme since
the mid-1960s, with the rise of the time-share mainframe computers. There is today a
considerable body of literature in this area, which is a core part of computer and network
security. Generally, the term access control is applied not only to physical access (to the
computer systems) but also to system-resources (e.g. memory, disk, files, etc). Notable
among the early efforts in the late early 1970s was the Multics system [18]. It was Multics
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. A data processor
is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf
of the controller [7].
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which, among others, introduced the notion of protection rings – a concept which has been
inherited by many operating systems today.
In the context of government and military applications, there was the further issue of
access based on a person’s rank or security clearance. Here, the the concept of mandatory
and discretionary access control in multi-level systems came to the forefront in the form of
the Bell and LaPadula Model (BLM) [19]. In this model, access control is defined in terms of
subjects possessing different security levels, seeking access to objects (i.e. system resources).
Thus, for example, in the BLM model a subject (e.g. user) is permitted to access an object
(e.g. file) if the subject’s security level (e.g. “Top Secret”) is higher than security level of
the object (e.g. “Secret”). The notion of roles or capacities was added to this model, leading
to the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. Here, as a further refinement of the BLM
model, a subject (user) may have multiple roles or capacities within a given organization.
Thus, when the subject is seeking access to an object, he or she must indicate the role within
which the request is being made. The formal model for RBAC was defined by NIST in
1992 [20].
Access control to resources is also a major concern for enterprises and corporations. This
need became acute with the widespread adoption of Local Area Network (LAN) technology
by enterprise organizations in the 1990s. The same RBAC model applies also to corporate
resources attached to the corporate LAN. Corporate security policies was therefore expressed
in terms of access-control policies as applied to subjects in certain roles seeking access to
objects residing within a given administrative domain. This problem was often referred to as
Authentication, Authorization and Audit (AAA) in the 1990s [21]. Part of the AAA model
developed during the 1990s was an abstraction of functions pertaining to deciding access
rules, from functions pertaining to enforcing them. Entities which decided on access-rules
were denoted as Policy Decision Points (PDP), while entities that enforced these access-rules
were denoted as Policy Enforcement Points (PEP)[22]. Figure 2 summarizes this abstraction.
The policy-based access control model is foundational to many systems deployed within
enterprises today. Many solutions, such as Microsoft’s Active Directory (AD), are built on
the same model of policy-based access control. In the case of AD, a fairly sophisticated cross-
domain architecture was developed which allows an enterprise to logically arrange itself into
dozens to hundreds of interior domains (e.g. each department as a different domain). Permis-
sions and entitlements for subjects (employees) are expressed in a comprehensive Privilege
Attribute Certificate (PAC) data structure [23].
As we will see in the following sections, although the policy-based access control model
works well within the enterprise, there many challenges today in carrying-over the model to
the “consumer” (non-enterprise) use-cases.
3 Mediated Authentication & Authorization
Today there are a number of entities on the Internet which mediate transactions between an
individual (client) and an online service provider. One key offering of many of these entities
5
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Figure 2: Overview of the Policy Based Access Control with PDPs and PEPs
is that mediated authentication services.
In this section we introduce a slightly modified terminology for clarity of discussion. This
is to avoid employing industry jargon, which is often inaccurate and a product of historical
development. For example, instead of using the generic term “service provider” for the
entities which offer a broad range of offerings, we use the more specific terms of Goods &
Services Provider (GSP) and Resources Services Provider (RSP). The first denotes entities
which offer goods (e.g. Amazon), while the later denote entities that offer computer-related
resources such as cloud-based storage (e.g. DropBox), compute capabilities (e.g. AWS/EC2)
and others. We denote the third party entity seeking to be authenticated or authorized (prior
to accessing a resource) as the Requesting Party (RqP).
In order to understand better the notion of federation, it is useful to review briefly the
notion of authentication and authorization of a client as provided by the third-party providers
of these functions (see Figure 2):
• AuthenticatioN Provider (ANP): A mediated Authentication Provider has the task of
managing and validating a user’s credential (e.g. password, keys) on behalf of a GSP
entity. This allows a GSP to be relieved from having to manage the credentials belonging
to users (customers). Typically the GSP has a business relationship with the ANP,
before the user can perform authentication to the ANP.
There are several variations of the authentication provider protocols. Generally, the
ANP issues an authentication-token as proof of the Client’s successful authentication
event at the ANP. The authentication-token can be delivered to the GSP via the Client
(front channel), or the token can be delivered directly from the ANP to the GSP (back
channel). An example of these tokens are the Kerberos tickets [24] ands SAML2.0 login
assertions [25].
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Today the ANP function is fulfilled by a category of providers referred to as Identity
Providers (IdP). The typical consumer-facing IdP issues an identifier (e.g. email ad-
dress) and manages the credentials of the user (e.g. change password). When the user
seeks to access services offered by the GSP, the user is temporarily redirected to the IdP
for authentication. The IdP issues an authentication-token which can then be validated
by the GSP.
• AuthoriZation Provider (AZP): A mediated Authorization Provider has the task of
managing access policies (authorizations) pertaining to access to a resource, such as
files, document, media and so on. The resource typically resides at an RSP entity,
and the owner of the resource sets the access policies at the AZP entity. A back-
channel typically exists between the AZP and the RSPs, permitting the policy rules
and configuration settings to be communicated from the AZP to the RSPs directly.
Looking at Figure 2, the AZP implements function of the Policy Decision Point (PDP)
while an RSP implements the function of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
When a third party (requesting party) seeks to access a given resource at an RSP, it
must first be authenticated an ANP entity who issues it with an authentication-token.
The ANP is assumed to have a business relationship with the AZP. The requesting party
the wields the authentication-token to the AZP entity as proof that the requesting party
has been authenticated. The AZP in turn issues an authorization-token (e.g. OAuth2.0
token, Microsoft PAC) as a means to convey the access privileges assigned to the user
(subject), for given resource at the RSP.
Note that some entities may in fact offer both ANP and AZP functions within a single
platform. For example, a user that seeks to access an online word-processing platform (e.g.
Google Docs) may be prompted to login and prove their password. Here the word-processing
platform is a resource protected by the AZP function, while the password validation process
is provided by the ANP function. As another example, in the Kerberos system [24] the Key
Distribution Center (KDC) acts as both the ANP and AZP depending on the exchange and
message type received from the Client.
In order to scale-up services, over the years a number of authentication providers (“iden-
tity providers”) in the consumer space have banded together to form consortiums that provide
its members with a broader reach for their services collectively. We use the term Authenti-
cation Federation (or identity federation) for this kind of arrangement. The goal of authen-
tication federation is essentially to help the GSP entities to ensure that a new or returning
user (i.e. customer) can be authenticated quickly. To achieve this efficiency, a GSP enters
into a business relationship either with an ANP who is a member of the federation or with
the federation organization directly. An authentication federation typically operates under a
set of bylaws and contracts, referred to the identity federation Legal Trust Framework (LTF)
for the association (e.g. see [26, 27]).
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4 Federation of Mediated Authorization Services
While the notion of authentication federation has evolved over the past decade – driven
primarily by the large number of online merchants that require one-step credentials manage-
ment and payments mechanism that are consumer-friendly – mediated authorization services
remains a nascent paradigm in the consumer space. In the enterprise space, mediated au-
thorization is a well known and mature function. This is notably true in enterprises which
employ policy-driven permissions (entitlements) management for employees, which is usually
tied to Directory Services (e.g. Microsoft Active Directory).
In the consumer space mediated authorization remains nascent primarily due to the lack of
business drivers. As mentioned above, we believe that in the near future as private and public
institutions begin to implement the compliance requirements stemming from the various
privacy regulations (e.g. GDPR, CCPA), these institutions – and GDPA data controllers –
will have to manage the resources (personal data) of citizens (data subjects), and consequently
manage access to those resources.
In the following we use the classic policy-based resource access control [20] as our starting
point (shown earlier in Figure 2), and apply it to a collection of domains, each representing
distinct data controllers (i.e. data-holding institutions). In Figure 4, both Domain 1 and
Domain 2 holds resources (personal data) associated with an individual, which we refer to as
the data subject (or simply subject) following the GDPR definition [7]. The subject has data
located at both Domain 1 and Domain 2. A third party, denoted as the requesting party,
seeks access to the subject’s data located in Domain 1.
There are three (3) main goals for a scalable federated authorization model:
• Cross-domain policy propagation and enforcement: A subject (resource owner) must be
able to set access policies in one domain, and have the policies automatically propagated
to all domains in the federation that contain the subject’s resources and have those
policies enforced locally by each relevant domain.
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An example is illustrated in Figure 4, where the subject sets access policies at PDP2
in Domain 2 while enforcement occurs also in Domain 1 to resources in PEP1.1 where
the subject’s resources reside.
• Decentralization of enforcement: Once an access policy is decided at one PDP in one
domain, enforcement within all domains in the federation that contain the subject’s
resources must occur automatically without the subject’s further involvement. Each
PEP in each relevant domain must operate independently of other PEPs in the same
domain or other domains.
• Legal trust framework for cross-domain authorization: A legal trust framework must
be agreed upon by all domain-owners in the federation, one which defines the agreed
behavior of PDPs and PEPs in propagating access policies and enforcing them.
An increasingly popular implementation instance of the mediated authorization model is
the user-managed access (UMA) architecture and protocols, based on the current OAuth2.0
framework. This will discussed in the next section in the context of its application to personal
data.
5 Federated Authorization for Personal Data: UMA
The User Managed Access (UMA) architecture [28, 29] is an extension of the popular OAuth2.0
framework [30] that provides basic authorization based on a JSON access token. The entities
and flows in OAuth2.0 is a subset of the role-based access control model (RBAC) discussed
earlier, where the three (3) entities are the Client, the Authorization Server (AS) and the
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Resource Server (RS). A client seeking access to a resource (e.g. file) located at the resource
server must first obtain an authorization-token (called “access token”) from the authoriza-
tion server (as the PDP). Once the token is obtained, the client must present the token in
the access request to the resource server. As the PEP, the resource server must enforce the
access-rule scoped within the token.
Readers familiar in the classic RBAC model [20] might find the OAuth2.0 model per-
plexingly simple and even limiting [31]. However, it is worthwhile to note the motivations
as to why OAuth2.0 emerged and flourished. One key reason for the success of OAuth2.0
was the need at the time to address the need for applications (apps) in mobile devices to
obtain renewable authorizations to access low-value accounts (e.g. online calendar, photos,
etc) belonging to the device owner. Thus, the typical scenario involves the device-owner
“authorizing” an app software on the device to access an account (e.g. calendar account,
social media account) belonging to the device-owner. This scenario is often referred to as
owner-to-owner (sharing with self) because the same person owned the device/app and the
corresponding online accounts.
Given the real-world constraints – namely the popularity of OAuth2.0 on social media
platforms and mobile devices – the UMA effort sought to instead re-use the same 3-party
OAuth2.0 framework for the positive benefit of individuals. The UMA philosophy is that
individuals should be empowered to control access to their personal data and resources re-
gardless of where these are located on the Internet. He or she must be empowered to grant
access (issue consent) to a requesting party and to revoke access (retract consent). As such,
the UMA philosophy has been consistent with much of the data privacy discourse in the
World Economic Forum [1, 10] for the past decade and with the GDPR notion of informed
consent [7].
The basic UMA entities are shown in Figure 5. Following OAuth2.0, the basic entities are
the Client, Authorization Server (AS) and the Resource Server (RS). UMA goes a step further
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in adding a fourth entity, namely the Requesting Party (RqP), which can be a person or legal
entity. Additionally, UMA requires that (a) the Requesting Party obtain an authentication-
token from an Identity Provider, and that (b) both the Requesting Party and the Client (i.e.
operator of the Client application) to obtain separate access-tokens from AS (shown as Step 4
in Figure 5). This last step in effect brings the Client-operator explictly into the ecosystem
and therefore forces it to also obtain consent from the resource owner (the individual).
Overall, the UMA architecture contributes to advancing the empowerment of individuals
to control access to their resources in the following ways:
• Subject-centric policy setting: The main focus in UMA is the data-subject (resource
owner Alice in Figure 5) whose resources (personal data) are located at differing domains
(institutions) on the Internet. Access request flows cannot begin until the subject has
set access policies on the resources.
• Authorization for the client-operator: UMA requires both the requesting party (Bob in
Figure 5) and the client-operator (Service Provider A in Figure 5) to obtain separate
access-tokens as proof of authorization to access personal data belonging to Alice as
data-subject (resource owner). This is because UMA explicitly recognizes that data
(to which the requesting party has been granted access) will flow through the IT in-
frastructure of the client-operator (e.g. cloud infrastructure). In the current situation
(without UMA) the client-operator would be free to scan and even copy data flowing
through their systems – effectively creating a “data privacy leakage” in the ecosystem.
• Support for cross-domain federated authorization: The UMA architecture is designed to
support federated authorization across multiple domains (see Figure 6). The standard-
ized data structure used to propagate the access policies between the Authorization
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Server (as the PDP) and the multiple Resource Servers (as the PEPs) is the permis-
sions ticket. UMA itself is agnostic to the policy expression syntax or language and can
support any policy syntax (e.g. XACML).
Thus, Figure 6 illustrates the case where Alice as the resource owner has personal data
at both RS1 and RS2. Alice sets her access policies at one location only, namely at
AS2. Bob is seeking access to Alice’s data at RS1. The UMA architecture supports
the propagation of the permission ticket from the AS2 (PDP2) in the originating-
domain (Domain 2) to the RS1 (PEP1) in the enforcing-domain (Domain 1). The
signed permission ticket can be propagated from Domain 2 to Domain 1 either directly
from AS2 to AS1, or it can be propagated cross-domain from AS2 to AS1, followed by
a transfer from AS1 to RS1. This allows RS1 (PEP1) to enforce Alice’s access policies
even though Alice may subsequently be off-line.
One of the roles of the UMA architecture and protocol specifications in the context of
federating the data controllers is to provide the technical foundation for these controllers to
establish a legal trust framework for collectively governing access to personal data at their
respective domains. A group of data controllers in a given vertical or sector (e.g. financial
data) could establish a federation consortium for the purposes of providing individuals the
capacity to use data for their own purposes, as stated in [10]. The legal trust framework
for the consortium would specify the various aspect of the membership roles, duties and
obligations with regards to implementing the UMA-based federated authorization. For ex-
ample, this could include specific the consortium-specific policy expression syntax/language,
name-spaces, data schema, privacy rules, and so on.
6 Conclusions
Today personal data of an individual is distributed throughout the Internet, in both private
and public institutions, and increasingly also on the user’s devices. We believe that individuals
need meaningful control over their personal data. Individuals must be empowered by giving
them a say in how data about them is used by organizations and by giving individuals the
capacity to use data for their own purposes.
However, in order to provide an individual with practical control over their personal
data the various data controller entities need to collectively provide federated authorization
to govern access to that personal data. The overall goal of federated authorization is to
empower the individual to set access policies (consent permission) at one location (e.g. at
one data controller) and have the access policies propagated to other data controllers and be
enforced there also. In this way, the individual is relieved from having to log-in to many sites
for the purpose or configuring the access policies multiple times.
The User Managed Access (UMA) architecture implements such a federated authorization
model. UMA provides subject-centric policy setting capabilities that allows the individual
to configure access policies (consent) and to retract those policies. It is designed to support
12
federated authorization across multiple domains, which in this case corresponds to the various
organizations and institutions which hold personal data.
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